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Abstract. In an international setting, sovereignty of countries imposes serious
problems on compliance and participation for a multilateral environmental agreement.
This paper discusses both problems simultaneously in a three-country-setting. It
employs a repeated-game-model and develops some basic conditions which
agreements must meet. These conditions are applied on a specific model which allows
only<a subcoalition of two countries to join an agreement. However, this subcoalition
is able to introduce transfer policies which initiate extra reductions of the outsider
country. The paper shows that transfer policies may be based on a cost-inferior
technology which makes non-compliance less attractive.
This paper was presented at the First Workshop of the Human Capital and Mobility Program
"Designing Economic Policy for Management of Natural Resources and the Environment" in
Rethymnon, Crete, September 7-9, 1994. I gratefully acknowledge financial support for the
workshop by the European Union. Thank are also due to the participants of the workshop for fruitful
discussion. I am especially indebted to Parkash Chander, Michael Hoel and Henry Tulkins for helpful
comments. Of course, none of them is responsible for any remaining errors and deficiencies.
The authors are solely responsible for the contents and distribution of each Kiel Working Paper. Since
the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form, interested readers are requested to direct
criticism and suggestions directly to the authors and to clear any quotations with them.1. Introduction
During the last decade, the public concern has shifted the focus of environmental problems
from local hot spots to international or even global pollution problems, and so did
environmental economics. Expanding the pollution-concerned area has created not only a new
spatial problem. The challenge of international environmental policies is due to the lack of a
central authority which is able enforce a specific environmental resource use. From an
international perspective, regulation must be grounded on the voluntary participation of those
countries which use and exploit the environmental resource. The sovereignty of countries
implies that international environmental agreements must guarantee that every national
participant is at least not worse off by fulfilling the requirements of the agreement voluntarily
than by behaving opportunistically.
Because restricting international pollution provides a public good, environmentalists fear that
the strategy of free riding will turn out as a dominant one of all countries and will deteriorate
environmental quality significantly or even endanger human living conditions. Economists
discussing international pollution problems are not in that way pessimistic although they do
not always claim that full cooperation will emerge. Most of the respective literature
concentrates on the possibility of stable coalitions as a subset of resource-using countries (see
BARRETT, 1991, 1992, BAUER, 1992, CARRARO, SINISCALCO, 1993, HEAL, 1992). Stability
demands that every sovereign member-country is always better off by remaining in the
^coalition than by leaving it and every outsider is always worse off by joining the coalition.
Partial cooperation can emerge if the stable coalition contains more than one member.
However, these papers deal with the notion of sovereignty only in terms of voluntary
participation. When countries have decided to sign an environmental treaty, they are supposed
to behave compliant and to be able to stick credibly to the agreed-upon reduction policies.
This paper addresses the problem that countries need not to behave compliant because they
are always able to repudiate the demands of other countries as interfering with their sovereign
affairs. It assumes that the agreed-upon reduction plans must be self-enforcing and that all
countries decide simultaneously whether they fulfil the requirements of an agreed-upon
policy or they breach the agreement. The questions of compliance and participation will be
addressed to simultaneously.
Accordingly, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some basic conditions which
multilateral environmental agreements must fulfil in a three-country-setting. Section 3
employs a specific model to shed some more light on this three-country-case. This model
implies that only a subcoalition of two countries joins an environmental agreement. Section 4demonstrates that the subcoalition's cooperation is not necessarily the end of international
environmental policies when a subcoalition introduces transfer policies for extra reductions of
the outsider country. Section 4 demonstrates also that the subcoalition may base transfer
policies on a cost-inferior technology which makes non-compliance less attractive. Section 5
summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Conditions for Multilateral Environmental Agreements
This section will outline five basic conditions which multilateral agreements must meet. All
conditions are due to the sovereignty constraint which imposes restrictions on any agreement.
The sovereignty constraint has a twofold implication. On the one hand, sovereignty implies
that participation must be voluntary. In principle, no country can be forced to sign a
multilateral agreement. On the other hand, sovereignty enables every country to breach the
agreement whenever it likes to. Therefore, every multilateral environmental agreement must
guarantee that every participating country is not better off by breaching the agreement than by
fulfilling the requirements of the agreement.
This paper will deal with both features simultaneously. It assumes three countries i, j and k
which suffer from mutual externalities caused by emissions. Restricting the externalities
benefits every country, but every country is better off when only the other two countries
introduce reduction measures. The benefits and the costs of reduction policies are common
knowledge: As all countries decide simultaneously on their current reduction level, any
multilateral environmental agreement can only be made self-enforcing by credible future
actions which depend on past compliance. The notion of credibility acknowledges that an
international environmental agreement is open for renegotiation. Thus, renegotiation-
proofness determines conditions which multilateral environmental agreements must meet.
The model assumes that the utility of every country can begiven by utility functions:
(1) Vl6{i,j,k}: Ul(Ri,Rj,R1) =
Rj, Rj and R^ denote the reductions of the respective countries, Bj and C^j are the benefits
and the costs which depend on the sum of reductions or the individual reductions,respectively. 1 Utility functions like (1) indicate that the problem in question is a global one
(e.g. the climate problem) because reductions are a homogeneous service for all countries.
Obviously, all countries can be better off by a multilateral environmental agreement than by
adjusting their reductions independently. The sovereignty constraint imposes certain
restrictions on the agreement. This paper assumes that an international agreement should at
least meet the conditions of weak renegotiation-proofness (Farrell, Maskin, 1989) and the
conditions of coalition-proofness (Bernheim, Peleg, Whinston, 1987). Deriving solutions
subject to the constraints weak renegotiation-proofness and coalition-proofness impose is
motivated by empirical evidence. On the one hand, countries which have signed an agreement
can always renegotiate after one country has breached the agreement. Therefore, punishment
by non-cooperation in all future periods or by even worse equilibrium outcomes lacks
credibility when renegotiation is possible. On the other hand, negotiations among all
concerned countries do not guarantee that either an agreement is reached which covers all
countries or no agreement is reached. Agreements of subcoalitions which meet the conditions
of weak renegotiation-proofness for their parties cannot be ruled out but determine outside
options.
The analytic framework of this paper is given by an infinitely repeated game. Because
agreements specify reduction duties for all countries which have ratified the agreement, only
pure strategies are considered. All countries discount future utilities by stationary discount
factors 5j, 8j and 8^, respectively. These discount factors mirror a crucial parameter of the
model because they indicate the "impatience" of each country. An extremely impatient
country can be imagined as a country facing significant domestic problems. These problems,
e.g. problems of development and problems of unemployment, bias policy objectives towards
aiming at short-run gains. If political issues are governed by the need for quick success,
impatience reflects a higher degree of institutional instability if institutional stability is
defined by the scope left to policy makers to deal with long-run problems at the expense of
short-run gains.
The first three conditions which sovereignty imposes on multilateral environmental
agreements are due to weak renegotiation-proofness. Weak renegotiation-proofness defines
conditions for an agreement in the phase after one country has not fulfilled its reduction
duties. Weak renegotiation-proofness reconciles the necessity of punishing a non-compliant
country and the option of restarting cooperation. A weakly renegotiation-proof device is a
1 The superscript 0 indicates the best available reduction technology. Section 4 will employ other
technologies when transfer policies are discussed. As it is obvious that any joint reduction policy
employs the least-cost technology, the technology choice will not yet be considered in this section in
order to avoid unnecessary confusion.rule laid down in the agreement that all countries except the non-compliant one will realize
their "breach" levels after one country has not fulfilled its reduction duties. Restarting
cooperation is possible because these countries will return to the agreed-upon reduction levels
after the non-compliant country has met its agreed-upon obligations unilaterally in one
period. This device is immune against renegotiations if the agreed-upon reductions induce a
non-compliant country to carry its reduction level unilaterally in order to restart cooperation.
According to this punishment device, weak renegotiation-proofness defines three conditions.
Condition 1: For every country, the long-run gains from cooperation must not fall short
of the short-run gains of breaching the agreement in one period and no
cooperation in all following periods.
(Cl) Vle{ifj,k}fVR,
b:
Rj and R.\ denote the agreed-upon reduction level for country 1 and the vector of the
agreed-upon reduction levels of the other countries, respectively. Note that Rj and R*! do
not necessarily give Pareto-optimal levels; if the conditions are too demanding, only lower
levels can meet the conditions.
2 Rj
b and R\ denote reduction levels which are associated with
a breach and the non-cooperative reduction level of country 1, respectively. This non-
cooperative reduction level depends on the reduction levels of the other countries, R.\. Note
also that Condition 1 assumes that every country has decided for joining a multilateral
environmental agreement. It does not address the question whether participation benefits the
country more than staying away from the agreement. Condition 5 will deal with this question.
(Cl) is a basic condition for the agreement. This condition on its own defines the self-
enforceability of an agreement if punishment by a grim strategy were credible and
renegotiations were impossible. However, weak renegotiation-proofness adds another two
conditions.
Condition 2: Given that a non-compliant country wants to restart cooperation as soon as
possible, the gains from cooperation must not fall short of breaching the
agreement in one period and restarting cooperation by realizing its agreed-
upon reduction level unilaterally.
A weakly renegotiation-proof agreement does always exist since at least the non-cooperative reduction
levels fulfil the conditions.(C2) Vle{i,j,k},VR|\VRV
Condition 3: After a country has breached the agreement, it wants to restart cooperation
as soon as possible.
(C3) Vle{i,j,k},
R.j^ denotes the vector of reduction levels of the compliant countries after country 1 has
breached the agreement. Condition 2 defines ex ante compliance in stating that every country
must be weakly better off by fulfilling the agreement than by breaching it in one period and
reinvesting in cooperation in the next period. Condition 2, however, assumes that a
potentially non-compliant country wants to restart cooperation as soon as possible. The
corresponding constraint is given in Condition 3 which defines ex post compliance.
Note that these conditions are stronger when compared to subgame-perfect stabilization
mechanisms which include grim strategies, too. However, they are also weaker compared to
the concept of strong renegotiation-proofness. Strong renegotiation-proofness acknowledges
the possibility that every country which has breached the agreement can suggest a new
agreement which should substitute for punishment and restarting cooperation according to the
old agreement's device. If an alternative, also weakly renegotiation-proof agreement exists
and Pareto-dominates punishment and restarting of cooperation, countries should be expected
to renegotiate away from the old agreement, thereby making the old agreement's punishment
incredible.
Neglecting this option for multilateral environmental agreements means assuming some kind
of commitment of every country in that countries will never renegotiate for a new agreement
after a breach. There is some empirical evidence which supports this commitment
opportunity. Governments representing their countries in international negotiations can be
assumed to refuse signing a new agreement because the public prefers cooperation and wants
non-compliant countries to be punished. Additionally, any new agreement which Pareto-
dominates punishment and restarting cooperation must compensate the compliant countries
for their dispense with punishment by offering them more individual cooperation gains. This
shift in individual cooperation gains may conflict with some generally accepted rules whichdetermine how cooperation gains should be split among counties. Section 3 will develop
explicit solutions for specific utility functions and for a certain split rule.
This paper discusses multilateral environmental agreements which potentially embrace three
countries. This case is an important one because agreements which potentially embrace more
than two countries-need not only be immune against deviations of single countries but against
deviations of subcoalitions as well. For the three-country-case, subcoalitions comprise two
countries. Any of the three possible subcoalitions must not be better off by jointly exploiting
the third country. The role of coalitions other than the grand coalition was formalized by the
concept of coalition-proofness (Bernheim, Peleg, Whins ton, 1987). Contrary to the
Bernheim-Peleg-Whinston-paper, the assumption of an infinitely repeated game does not
allow for taking the actions of a third party as given. Instead, if a third party is exploited by a
subcoalition, this party will revert to its breach level until both parties have reinvested in a
restarting cooperation by meeting their obligations. Additionally, the subcoalition's benefits
from cheating for a coalition are determined not only by the benefits of breaching the
agreementnn one period, but also from the benefits of a subcoalition's cooperation in all
following periods. If both non-compliant countries can do better than reverting to the non-
cooperative reduction levels and if they do not want to restart cooperation, the formed
subcoalition which exploited the third party will proceed with cooperation by a joint
reduction policy. Condition 4 defines the corresponding constraints for a joint reduction
policy in the grand coalition.
Condition 4: Any subcoalition must not be better off by cheating in one period and a
weakly renegotiation-proof agreement between the subcoalition's countries
for the following periods, given the reductions of the third country.
(C4) V{p,q} € {{i, j},{j,k},{i,k}},Vl e {i, j,k \ p,q},VR5,VRq
b,





3 denote the reduction levels of a breaching subcoalition. Rp and Rq are
reduction levels which are self-enforcing between the two parties in the subcoalition.
Condition 4 collects the arguments of Conditions 1-3 for all possible subcoalitions.
However, the concept of coalition-proofness according to Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston
(1987) and its reformulation by Condition 4 do not cover all aspects of subcoalitions because
they focus exclusively on the joint breach of an agreement. In addition, every potential
subcoalition has a commitment problem. If one country refuses any cooperation, the other
two countries are still able to reach a bilateral agreement. The result in reductions of a
bilateral agreement is anticipated by the third country and determines its gains from refusing
cooperation. Condition 5 completes the constraints imposed by subcoalitions and gives a
precondition for Condition 1 and Condition 3 which assumed that all countries want to form
the grand coalition. Let R_! denote the reduction levels of the two other countries if country 1
stays away from the agreement. R_, is determined by the subcoalition's agreement because
the remaining two countries cannot commit themselves not to realize possible cooperation
gains.
Condition 5: If one country wants to stay away from the agreement, the other two
countries will cooperate if cooperation improves on the purely non-
cooperative outcome. If more than one country wants to stay away from the
agreement, the two countries which benefit most from a subcoalition's
agreement negotiate away from the purely non-cooperative outcome. The
agreement between these two countries determines the utility of the country
which stays away from the agreement. If every country prefers a
subcoalition with a country which prefers a subcoalition with the third
country, a subcoalition will be formed but the subcoalition's parties are












A denotes the set of countries which join a multilateral environmental agreement. R" gives
the non-cooperative reduction level of country 1 for the case that the other two countries form
a subcoalition. R" falls short of Rj in the case of non-orthogonal reaction functions. Note
that (C5) is incomplete in describing Condition 5 because it does not include the ambiguity
case.
All five conditions can restrict the scope for multilateral environmental agreements
considerably. The following section will demonstrate a specific model which allows only a
subcoalition of two countries to join an environmental agreement.3. Self-Enforcing Cooperation in a Three-Country-Model
Section 2 has developed five conditions to be met by multilateral environmental agreements.
This section will employ a specific model in order to emphasize the role of domestic
institutional settings for the performance of an international agreement. Differences in
institutional settings are indicated by differences in discount factors. A high discount factor
mirrors "institutional toughness" of the potential signatory country. In order to develop the
role of different discount factors, this section assumes identical cost and benefit functions:
,(2) Vle{i,j,k}: B,=a[Ri+Rj+Rk],Cl
)=|R2)
Benefits are a linear function of the sum of reductions, costs are a quadratic function of
domestic reductions. These functions imply orthogonal reaction functions and thereby let the
reduction level for non-cooperation and a breach of the agreement coincide. The discount
factors are assumed to differ:
(3) 8j = 8j = 8 > 0.5, 8k< 0.5.
. Two countries exhibit a comparably high discount factor which signals a "tough" institutional
setting. In these countries, long-run gains are given a significantly stronger weight than in
country k. Country k is assumed to bear a strong domestic pressure on short-run issues. E.g.,
countries i and j could represent industrialized countries and county k's impatience could
represent the pressure felt by a government of a developing country which is lacking
economic prosperity.3
It is helpful to start the discussion of (2) and (3) for multilateral environmental agreements by
considering the potential cooperation between only two of the three countries. The
orthogonality of the reaction functions lets the result of a subcoalition's agreement coincide
with the outside option of a subcoalition (see Condition 4) and the subcoalition's agreement if
one country refuses to cooperate. Additionally, the functional form given by (2) has the
convenient property that all three conditions imposed by weak renegotiation-proofness fall
together for the potential cooperation between two countries (see Appendix A.1).
The indicated values of the discount factors are not out of any empirical range because environmental
agreements address periods which cover several years. In many cases, compliance can be verified not
before a couple of years after the agreement was ratified, especially when environmental data are
available only with a significant delay.Note that the punishment device defined by Conditions 2 and 3 was somewhat arbitrary in
specifying a one-period-investment which restarts cooperation. In general, a punishment
device could also want a non-compliant country to invest n periods in providing the agreed-
upon reduction level unilaterally before the other countries restart cooperation. An increasing
n strengthens the power of the ex ante compliance constraint of Condition 2 but weakens the
power of the ex post compliance constraint of Condition 3 because it decreases the incentive
to invest into a restart of cooperation after a contract breach has occurred. For (2) and n = 1,
both constraints have the same power and are thereby equalized. If a certain condition
dominated the other conditions (as it is the case if n is not set unity), lowering n could make
all countries better off, as an extremely biting constraint may restrict cooperation more than
necessary. The paper does not consider strategic aspects of different n, but it should have
become clear that n = 1 is an appropriate assumption for the specific model of this section.
According to weak renegotiation-proofness, Rp and Rq of two countries p and q, p,q e
{i,j,k}, have to fulfil
12
(4) gives the conditions of weak renegotiation-proofness for a subcoalition with two parties p
and q but does not determine the concrete outcome of the subcoalition's agreement. An
additional assumption is necessary how cooperation gains are to be divided between the two
countries. This paper will consider two variants of all possible sharing rules, equal split and
maximal bargaining gains for one country.
According to (3), two cases have to be distinguished when evaluating the equal split results.
In a first variant, assume that country i and country j bargain for a subcoalition's agreement.
Equal split assumes that both countries' bargaining gains equalize:
Obviously, (5) implies identical reduction levels when an equal-split policy should be
realized. Due to their institutional toughness, both countries are able to join an agreement
which is optimal and self-enforcing for the subcoalition. This result does not hold if either
10country i or country j consider a subcoalition's agreement with country k.For example, any
equal-split-policy between country i and country k produces
(6) {p,q} = {i,l
As country i and country j are perfect twins, (6) holds for {p,q} = {j,k} accordingly. Every
agreement with country k suffers from the institutional weakness of this country. This









u, = 2 2
Comparing Uj in (6) and (7) shows that country i prefers an equal-split-policy with country j
compared to the best policy with country k if
6k< 2^ = 0.3849
holds. If country i (country j) is not able to realize a sufficiently large portion of the
bargaining gains, country i (country j) prefers to form a subcoalition with country j (country
11i). Thus, the assumptions of (3) give a lot of evidence that country i and country j form a
subcoalition. In an equal-split-setting, this subcoalition dominates the other two two-country-
teams. If only two countries were allowed to cooperate, the best team would obviously
include country i and country j because there is no scope for other subcoalitions in the case of
equal split and only little scope in the case of policies which favor the more patient country.
The remainder of this paper will therefore focus on the relevant outsider subcoalition which
includes country i and country j. This gives a preliminary result for Condition 5 because it
determines that the subcoalition {i,j} will be formed in cases when country k wants to stay
away from the agreement.
One might wonder whether transfers can mitigate the compliance problems. Obviously,
transfers between country i and j are not necessary because their equal-split-policy leads to
optimal reduction levels for the subcoalition. Appendix A.2 gives a sketch of the proofs that
transfers cannot help overcoming the compliance problems for a subcoalition of country i
(country j) and country k. Both countries choose deliberately a zero transfer level for the
equal-split-policy as well as for the best policy of country i (country j) because transfers
involve sovereignty risks, too. E.g. assume that in addition to certain reduction duties a
transfer payment from country i to country k is agreed-upon. Then, non-compliance of
country k means not to fulfil its reduction duties but to take the transfer. Non-compliance of
country i means not to fulfil its reduction duties and to refuse the transfer payment. The
opposite holds if country k pays country i. Appendix A.2 employs the corresponding four
compliance constraints to demonstrate the optimality of zero transfers.4
From the viewpoint of the grand coalition, the dominating role of the subcoalition of i and j
implies
• that the reduction levels are determined by the subcoalition between i and j if cooperation
is not possible in the grand coalition,
(see Condition 5), and
that the joint exploitation of a third country is apparently more attractive for the
subcoalition of country i and country j (see Condition 4).
The complete proofs are available upon request. Note that transfers can play a role if cost and benefit
functions differ. In this case, transfers serve for exploiting efficiency gains but not for ensuring
compliance.
12Assume that all countries have decided for cooperating in the grand coalition which splits
cooperation gains equally. Assuming a grand coalition means that no country wants to stay
away from the agreement and R'.j determines the outside option for every country 1.
According to the identity of cost and benefit functions, equal split means equal reductions.
A.
Let R denote the identical reduction levels of each country in a grand coalition. (Cl), (C2)
and (C3) fall together if (2) and (3) hold. Then, a grand coalition demands
R + R >
2a+ 1 P
Ri+Rk>_ + _—
R +R > + J_ Ki+Rj- |3
 +8k2
to be fulfilled. (8a) can be developed similar to the arguments given in Appendix A.1 for the
two-country-case. In this setting, country k's compliance constraint determines the individual
reduction levels:
(8b) R = |[l + 48k],
Ui= 0-0,= ^[5 + 168,-1652]
(8b) gives the utilities which are realized in a grand coalition with all countries. Now, two
countries evaluate whether they are better off by jointly breaching the agreement in one
period and founding a subcoalition for the following periods. Referring to the first line of
(C4), country i (country j accordingly) will not deceive country k together with country j if
(9) |l[5 + 168k]
o8k[l-28k+8i]-|>0
holds. (9) is not met by all combinations of 8j = 8; and 8^. If country k is extremely
impatient, especially when 8^ falls of from 0.1, it can pay for i and j to deceive k jointly.
13The assumption of a joint agreement breach of country i and country k gives a different
constraint (see the first line of (C4)). Country i (country j accordingly) will not deceive




«=> -46k + 12§l - 58; - 88i8k - Sfil < 0
holds. (10) is always fulfilled because 8k > 8k and 8j8k > 8k leads to
12SJ; - 88;8k - 48k < 0
which is a necessary and sufficient condition for (10). Thus, only country k is endangered to
be exploited jointly by countries i and j. But even if this exploitation risk could be excluded,
the implications of Condition 5 dominate the performance of the agreement. Condition 5
shapes the structure of the agreement because the high level of cooperation between i and j
induces country k to stay away from any agreement. Note that
(11) Vle{i,j,k}:
holds. 9/2 ot^/p is the Pareto-optimal level which an enforceable agreement specified. (11)
states that incorporating the impatient country k implies utility levels which fall short of the
Pareto-optimal ones. If country i (country j accordingly) decides to remain an outsider, it
anticipates that country j (country i) and country k realize the subcoalition's reduction levels
which gives country i a utility of
^ ^ -168
2k]
14This utility falls short from the utility in the grand coalition. Country i and country j do not
prefer the outsider position but country k does. This is the second case mentioned in (C5).





which give country k a utility of
(12) Uk=|^>
(12) proves that country k will always prefer to remain an outsider country. This result shapes
the structure of the environmental agreement which includes only country i and country j.
The model has demonstrated that Conditions 1 to 5, and especially Condition 5 which defines
the role of coalitions for outside options, can severely restrict the scope for cooperation. If (2)
and (3) hold, the multilateral environmental agreement is changed into a bilateral one.
Accordingly, (2) and (3) imply







if international environmental policies end up with the reduction game.
154. Transfers to the Outsider Country
The disappointing result of the last section is not necessarily the definite end of international
environmental policies. Although only a subcoalition consisting of country i and country j is
able to implement a joint reduction policy, further reductions are possible if the subcoalition's
reduction policy is supplemented by transfer policies. This section assumes that the
subcoalition founds a bilateral agency which organizes the transfers which the subcoalition
pays for extra reductions of country k on behalf of both countries. The agency is assumed to
be able to realize transfer policies which guarantee the maximal bargaining gains for the
donor countries.^ The agency is an institution founded by country i and country j and can be
imagined as an organization which works according to strictly predetermined rules. These
rules serve for commitment which enables the agency to reap the maximal bargaining gains
from transfer policies. Note that this assumption is not a too unrealistic one when compared
with international organizations like the World Bank and the Global Environmental Facilities
which obviously have a strong bargaining position.
In addition to the strong bargaining position, international organizations founded to support
countries do not merely reflect financial intermediaries. E.g., the Global Environmental
Facilities do not only pay for environmental services but support and control specific
environment-enhancing projects. Support is often given in kind. Support by in-kind transfers
is a superior transfer scheme if transfer policies must be self-enforcing (Stahler, 1992, 1994).
This section models these features of international organizations' transfer policies by
considering different reduction technologies. It assumes that technologies can be varied
steadily and steady variations can be indicated by a technology parameter X. The voluntarily
provided reduction level cc/p will be produced by a technology with X = 0 which carries the
lowest reduction costs. Basing transfer policies on a certain technology X produces additional
costs A in country k:
(14)
p denotes the additional agreed-upon reductions of country k. A technology which is
associated with a higher X carries higher organizational and technological costs. These higher
costs are due to an increasing degree of direct control and influence. The option of direct
Note that country k's incentive to remain an outsider country is strengthened if country k anticipates
transfers. However, assuming anticipation by the recipients and solving the models backwards does not
change the results of this paper. Even if anticipation induces i or j to prefer staying away from the
agreement, too, Condition 5 has specified that these countries would renegotiate away from the purely
non-cooperative outcome.
16control and influence increases costs and decreases the incentives for a transfer agreement's
breach.
A breach of a transfer agreement means to take the transfers but not to provide the additional
agreed-upon reductions. With an increasing X, the transfer is changed from a monetary into
an in-kind transfer, thereby influencing the non-compliance option. On the one hand, in-kind
transfers guarantee that a certain degree of reductions is realized independent of compliance.
On the other hand, in-kind transfers have a lower value for the recipient when recipients want
to breach the agreement because in-kind transfers can be used only for specific purposes and
incur retrading costs. Additionally, a certain part of the transfer may be withdrawn by the
donor in the case of non-compliance if the agency controls the project. Let p
1 and T
1 denote
the degree of reductions which is realized even in the case of non-compliance and the
recipient's value of transfers if he breaches the transfer agreement, respectively. Both terms
depend on X in that a higher X induces a higher p' and a lower T:
(15) p' = Ll-e"
DAJp, T' = e-
CAT, b,c>0.
T denotes the value of transfers when transfers are employed according to the agreement. On
the donors' side, a simple rule can make the agreement self-enforcing between country i and
country j. Assume that the equal-split-policy is also applied on joint transfer policies and both
countries carry the transfer payments equally. The agreement with country k may specify that
the agreed-upon reductions have only to be provided if both countries fulfil their transfer
obligations and thereby enable the agency to transfer the corresponding resources. This
specification rules out any incentive to deviate from the individual transfer payments and
allows for focusing on the relationship between the two donors and the recipient.
Let p* denote the degree of country k's additional reductions according to a transfer
agreement. T* denotes the agreed-upon transfers. According to the concept of weak
renegotiation-proofness, three conditions impose restrictions on possible transfer policies.
Condition 6: The long-run gains from the transfer agreement must not fall short of
breaching the agreement in one period and no cooperation in all following
periods.





ap* are the additional benefits of the recipient from its own extra reductions. (C6) gives the
basic condition for cooperation. No cooperation means no transfers and no additional
17reductions. The other two conditions associated with weak renegotiation-proofness demand to
specify how country k can restart cooperation. (15) guarantees for a strictly positive A that a
certain degree of additional reductions will be realized independent of compliance. (C7) and





Country k is able to restart cooperation after a breach by providing the difference between





Given that a non-compliant country k wants to restart cooperation as soon
as possible, the gains from the transfer agreement must not fall short of





After country k has breached the transfer agreement, it wants to restart
cooperation as soon as possible.










The international agency which organizes transfer policies on behalf of country i and country
j has been assumed to maximize the possible bargaining gains for the donors. The objective
of the agency is to maximize the difference between the Lindahlian utility of additional
reductions and the transfers necessary to guarantee compliance:^
(18) maxH s.t. Q = 2<xp* - T*, (C6)
1, (C7)', (C8)
1, p* > 0, X > 0.
(18) gives the maximization problem for a Stackelberg leader who predetermines the degree
of additional reductions and the technology.
The solution of this maximization problem could be developed along the lines of the Kuhn-
Tucker-Theorem. Instead, the remainder of this section will demonstrate that a maximizing
agency does not always chose the lowest-cost-technology. The proof will be developed by
contradiction. Assume that the least-cost-technology X = 0 does always maximize the
Lindahlian utility of the donor countries. In this case, (17) holds. For a fixed X = 0, the
solution for (18) is given by
(19) |^a = 0) = 2a-|^a = 0) = 0=>p*=2Sk|.
X = 0 is optimal if
(20)
holds. Let Tj, T2 and T3 denote the transfer levels which equalize (C6)', (C7)
1 and (C8)'.
Differentiating T\, T2 and T3 with respect to X, setting X = 0 and p = 28]ca/p
> gives the
following formulas for a marginal change away from the least-cost technology.
For obvious reasons, both country i and country j prefer a joint transfer policy compared to introducing
transfer policies separately. The condition that transfer payments should not fall of from the additional
costs is dominated by all three conditions.
19= 0,p* = 28k | j = ^{a[28k +1] + b[28




(22) and (23) reveal the ambiguous role of b which indicates the degree of reductions pushed
through by a technology in the case of non-compliance. Consider for example an increase of
b which decreases the costs of restarting cooperation. On the one hand, lower costs of
restarting cooperation makes non-compliance more attractive because the benefits from
breaching the agreement and restarting cooperation are increased (see C7)). On the other
hand, ex posrcompliance is made more attractive after k has breached the transfer agreement
because lower costs of restarting cooperation increase the incentive to restart cooperation as
soon as possible.





hold, (21), (22) and (23) are all negative and contradict the assumption of an optimal X = 0. In
this case, the utility of the donor countries could be improved on by increasing X. For
example, (24) is met by a = 0.1, b = 0.4, c = 0.8 and S^ = 0.4. (24) proves that there is some
scope for optimal transfer policies which do not employ the least-cost-technology. When
transfer policies are endangered by non-compliance of the recipient, switching to a cost-
inferior technology may increase compliance incentives and thereby overcompensate for
higher costs.
205. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has discussed the implications of some basic conditions which multilateral
environmental agreements should meet in the three-country-case. A specific model has shown
that cooperation can be restricted on two countries when one country lacks institutional
toughness. The concepts of renegotiation- and coalition-proofness as well as an extension
which defines the role of coalitions for outside options can explain the participation
endogenously. Referring to the model of Section 2, it is not surprising that the industrialized
countries are likely to go ahead with respect to a joint environmental policy.
The paper has also shown that a subcoalition's agreement is not necessarily the end of
international environmental policies. A subcoalition can introduce transfer policies in order to
buy some extra reductions of the outsider country. The model of Section 4 assumed a
Stackelberg leadership of the donor countries through an agency which specifies the degree of
extra reductions and the reduction technology. Technologies differ with respect to costs and
non-compliance options in that higher costs are attributed to those technologies which are
given in kind. Section 4's model has demonstrated that optimal transfer policies may employ
other than least-cost technologies because the benefits of decreasing non-compliance
incentives may overcompensate for higher costs. Thereby, the model could explain transfer
policies of multilateral organization, e.g. the Global Environmental Facilities. Both features,
the endogenous determination of participating countries and the role of transfer policies, seem
to be backed by empirical evidence.
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22Appendix A.1
For the two-country cooperation, the ousider country 1 chooses the reduction level a/p which
is also the non-cooperative reduction level and the breach level for both country p and























Solving for Rp and Rq in (A.l-1), (A.l-1)
1, (A.l-1)" and (A.l-2), (A.l-2)', (A.l-2)",
respectively, gives (4).
23Appendix A.2
Let X represent transfers which are paid from country i to country k. The introduction of
transfers changes the net utilities according to
As mentioned in the text, transfer payments are subject to sovereignty risks, too. The
compliance constraints are supplemented by X-terms and differ with respect to the donor's







X denotes the agreed-upon transfers from country i to country k (X < 0 indicates transfers
from country k to country i). When bargaining gains have to be split equally, %\ must equalize
(A.2-4) Tti =7Ck => X = |[Ri
The best equal-split-policy is the solution of
(A.2-5) maxn = 7Ti+7tk s.t. X = *~[R£ - Rf], (A.2-2), (A.2-3).
Inserting the four compliance constraints into the maximization problem demonstrates that
the first-order conditions give minima. The maxima are the corner solutions associated with
zero transfer levels.
24If country i is able to reap the maximal bargaining gains, the Kuhn-Tucker-approach can be
applied on either
(A.2-6) max ft; s.t. (A.2-2b) or
RpR^X
(A.2-7) max 7tj s.t. (A.2-3b).
R.j,R.|£,yC
Both approaches give an optimal zero transfer level.
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